Mearsheimer’s view — Structural realism

Essay by María Camila Quiroga

In “International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity,” John J. Mearsheimer claims: “When a state dials the emergency services for help, there is nobody in the international system to answer the call.”[i] To address this statement, one needs a body of realist theories, especially structural realism. In the present paper, I will examine what the author means by this affirmation and the analysis revolves around a number of questions: Why do states in international anarchy fear each other? Does it make sense for states to pursue hegemony? What is the security dilemma and how it contributes to the anarchic system? First, I will explain which aspects realists focus in the international system. Second, I will contrast the difference between defensive and offensive structural realists. Finally, I will give possible explanations of John Mearsheimer’s argument. According to him: “great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favour” and he argues that “the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other.” [ii]

Realist theories consider that states are concern by the balance of power and compete among themselves to gain power or to assure they do not lose it. “The real issues of international politics can be understood by the rational analysis of competing interests defined in terms of power”[iii], Jack Donnelly’s reference to Smith to explain realism. John Vasquez says that there are three main assumptions: “nation-states or their decision-makers are the most important actors for understanding international relations; there is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics; international relations is a struggle for power and peace.”[iv] For realists, states operate in an anarchic system; where there is no ultimate arbiter, and the competition for power makes them, in certain cases, fight each other. G. Lowes Dickinson introduces the concept of international anarchy: “in the great and tragic history of Europe there is a turning-point that marks the defeat of the ideal of a world-order and the definite acceptance of international anarchy. That turning-point is the emergence of the sovereign State at the end of the fifteenth century.”[v]

There are different points of view among realists. The main debate resides in the reason why the states pursue power. Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau believe that the answer is the human nature: “in which the laws of politics have their roots” and “the world...is the result of forces inherent in human nature.”[vi]

On the other hand, structural realists consider that the architecture of the international system is what makes states want power which is a means to an end; some are more or less powerful than others. Great powers are the principal actors in world politics. However, all of them have the same incentives to become a great power in order to survive; the ultimate end. As they operate in a self-help world, is the same anarchic structure of the system which pushes them to behave, under certain circumstances, like a revisionist state. “Satisfied states are interested in preserving the international status quo, whereas dissatisfied states are revisionist and want to change the existing order”[vii], explains Keith L. Shimko. All states have some offensive military capability that can be used to attack its neighboor. As they can never be certain about the intentions of other states: “not only become preoccupied with the balance of power, but acquire powerful incentives to gain power at each other’s expense.”[viii] According to the concept “security dilemma”, in which group and individuals are concerned about their security from being attacked by others: “they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the effects of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Because no state can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensures, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on”[ix], says Herz. For structural realism, peace is only possible if the great powers are content with the status quo.

There are also disagreements between structural realists related to: how much power is enough? Kenneth Waltz, defensive realist, considers that: “the placement of states affects their behaviour and even colors its characters. It also supports the proposition that states balance power rather than maximize it. States can seldom afford to make maximizing power their goal. International politics is too serious a business for that.”[x] It is important to mention that for realism, international politics is equal to power politics.

For defensive realism, if states attempt to gain too much power, the system will punish them and that is why the pursuit of hegemony is strategically foolish. “It assumes rational actors who make security their first priority because of the anarchy of the international system and the security dilemma it creates,”[xi] explains Richard Ned Lebow. For example, Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany were destroyed for their irrational behaviour and by fighting a series of losing wars: “all want to increase profits. If they run undue risks in the effort to do so, they must expect to suffer the consequences” and Kenneth Waltz continues that “to maximize profits tomorrow as well as today, firms first have to survive.”[xii]

On the contrary, John J. Mearsheimer defends the offensive realist view: “is mainly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future. But it is also a prescriptive theory. States should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world.”[xiii] Why do states fear each other? Mearsheimer gives three features of the international system to answer this question:

1. The absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other.

2. The fact that states always have some offensive military capability.

3. The fact that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions.

States should aim to have more power and should take advantage of all the opportunities that are offered in order to achieve hegemony; which is the best guarantee of survival. To have power is reflected in the material capabilities that a state controls, such as nuclear weapons. Moreover, there is also a latent power based on state’s wealth and the size of the whole population. The anarchic international system leaves them no choice, but to privilege their own interests ahead of the interests of other states, even the international community. For the author, that is the reason why, no state is willing to help another, because all of them are fighting for their own survival and to become especially powerful. “States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. They can pursue other goals like prosperity and protecting human rights, but those aims must always take a back seat to survival, because, if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals.”[xiv]

References

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[i] Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve (Ed.) (2007) International Relations Theories, Discipline and Diversity, Oxford, OUP, p.74.

[ii] Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton), p.1.

[iii] Donelly, Jack (2000) Realism and International Relations (Cambridge, UK: University Press), p.8.

[iv] John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (Rutgers, NJ :Rutgers University Press, 1983), p.18.

[v] Dickinson, G. L. (1916), The European Anarchy (New York: Macmillan Company).

[vi] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Six Principles of Political Realism," Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15.

[vii] Keith L. Shimko (2014) "International Relations: Perspectives, Controversies and Readings”, Fith Edition (Purdue University: Cengage Learning), p.64.

[viii] Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve (Ed.) (2007) International Relations Theories, Discipline and Diversity, Oxford, OUP, pp.73-74.

[ix] John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in. Theories and Realities, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951, p.157.

[x]Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York, McGraw Hill, p.127.

[xi] Lebow, Richard Ned (2010) Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p.31.

[xii] Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York, McGraw Hill, p.105.

[xiii]Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton), p.9.

[xiv] Mearsheimer, John J. (2007), 'Structural realism' in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds), International relations theories, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.74.